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Informed by a new theoretical framework that assigns a key role to “cultural tasks” 
(culturally prescribed means to achieve cultural mandates such as independence and 
interdependence) in mediating the mutual influences between culture and psychological 
processes, the authors predicted and found that North Americans are more likely than 
Western Europeans (British and Germans) to 1) exhibit focused (vs. holistic) attention, 2) 
experience emotions associated with independence (vs. interdependence), 3) associate 
happiness with personal achievement (vs. communal harmony), and 4) show an inflated 
symbolic self. In no cases were the two Western European groups significantly different 
from one another. All Western groups showed 5) an equally strong dispositional bias in 
attribution. Across all the implicit indicators of independence, Japanese were 
substantially less independent (or more interdependent) than the three Western groups. 
An explicit self-belief measure of independence and interdependence showed an 
anomalous pattern. These data were interpreted to suggest that the contemporary 
American ethos has a significant root in both Western cultural heritage and a history of 
voluntary settlement. Further analysis offered unique support for the cultural task analysis. 
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A Cultural Task Analysis of Implicit Independence: 
Comparing North America, Western Europe, and East Asia 
 
In 1890 the 11
th
 U.S. Census proclaimed that the last frontier disappeared. For 
nearly two centuries before then, Americans of mostly Western European origin left their 
East Coast cities to settle in Western frontiers (e.g., Stegner, 1953; Stewart, 1963). For 
these early settlers, Western frontiers symbolized personal freedom, opportunities, and 
redemption (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swindler & Tipton, 1985; Dewey, 1930; 
Tocqueville, 1969; Turner, 1920). Yet, the frontier did not cease to be relevant when it 
physically vanished in 1890. Once initiated, any culture can have its own life (Cohen, 
2001). In fact, there is every reason to believe that a dream for personal success and 
redemption – the American Dream – has continued to influence the American cultural 
ethos to this day. For example, the U.S. programs for space exploration, cutting-edge 
sciences, and many others are framed in terms of exploration of frontier (e.g., Faludi, 
2003; Klerkx, 2004). Moreover, the discourse of American Dream has continued to shape 
each and every person’s life by providing forceful narratives to live by (Hochschild, 
1995; McAdams, 2006). These considerations suggest that there should be substantial 
differences in mentality between Western Europeans and North Americans even though 
they share a common Western cultural heritage (see Turner, 1920, for an earlier 
sociological analysis of the issue).  
There is an emerging consensus in personality and social psychology that cultures 
vary in the extent to which either independence or interdependence is sanctioned 
(Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2004; Nisbett, 2003; 
Shweder & Bourne, 1982; Triandis, 1989; see also Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & 
Maynard, 2003). Up to this point, however, this literature has focused nearly exclusively 
on differences between West and East, with scant attention paid to possible differences 
within the West, between Western Europeans and North Americans in particular (see e.g., 
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Varnum, Grossmann, Katunar, Nisbett, & Kitayama, 2008 for an exception). This has 
been the case despite some obvious problems many scholars in political science (e.g., 
Inglehart & Baker, 2000), economics (e.g., Perlman & McCann, 1998), and philosophy 
(e.g., Russell, 1945/1992) have recognized in the notion of monolithic “Western mind.”   
In the present work we seek to fill in this gap of psychological knowledge. In so 
doing, we will present a new theoretical framework that places a key role in the notion of 
cultural tasks in accounting for the mutual influences between culture and psychological 
processes. Informed by this theoretical framework, we will test the hypothesis that the 
history of voluntary settlement fostered an especially high degree of implicit 
independence among North Americans (Kitayama & Bowman, in press; Kitayama, Ishii, 
Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006).  
It is challenging to test any historical hypotheses with contemporary 
psychological data. We tried to overcome this difficulty by comparing matched samples 
from North America, Western Europe (United Kingdom and Germany), and East Asia 
(Japan). We expected that the three Western groups (U.S., U.K., and Germany) would be 
more independent or less interdependent than the Eastern group (Japan) and, more 
importantly, we also anticipated that North Americans should be substantially more 
independent or less interdependent than Western Europeans as predicted by the voluntary 
settlement hypothesis. In an effort to exclude a number of confounding variables and thus 
make our conclusion more compelling, our design included the two divergent Western 
European groups.  
Culture and the Self 
It has been proposed that Western cultural contexts emphasize a view of self as 
independent, defined primarily by its internal attributes such as preferences, desires, and 
traits (Kitayama et al., 2007; Markus & Kitayama 1991). Such a view can be traced back 
to the ancient Greek civilization, where logic was invented as a practical means of 
differentiating good arguments from bad ones, and rhetoric was developed as a tool for 
 5 
debate (Morris, 1991; Nisbett, 2003; Taylor, 1979). Yet, most notably, the view of the 
self as independent was rediscovered and extensively elaborated in Western Europe 
during the era of Reformation and Renaissance. One pivotal event was the birth of 




 centuries. Some novel conceptions such as calling and 
predestination underscored the idea that each person has his or her inherent merit and, 
moreover, he or she is in direct communication with God (Weber, 1958). Furthermore, a 
number of prominent thinkers in the era of Enlightenment reinforced similar themes. All 
these forces converged to yield a general conception of self as independent, autonomous, 
and separate or socially disengaged. Within this framework, social relations are 
conceived as voluntary and thus optional (Morris, 1991; Taylor, 1979). This broad view 
of the self provides an epistemic basis for a social ideology of individualism, and has 
become a major cultural imperative or mandate. 
In contrast, in Eastern civilizations a contrasting view of self as interdependent, 
interpersonally connected, and socially embedded has been elaborated (Kitayama et al., 
2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  This general view of self can be found in the ontology 
of Buddhism (which emphasizes a unity of the universe including all creatures both past 
and present), Confucian ethics (which is grounded in the central significance given to 
hierarchical relationships at both societal and personal levels), and a variety of 
indigenous, holistic beliefs, such as Bushido and Taoism. Of course, the relational, 
interdependent view of self acknowledges one’s internal attributes such as desires, 
intentions, and attitudes. However, these attributes are not considered as primary. Instead, 
they are seen as coexisting with, contingent on, and often to be subordinated to the social 
order. These broad views of the self as relational provide an important epistemic basis for 
a social ideology of collectivism, and have become a major cultural mandate. 
Mutual Influence between Culture and Psychological Processes: A Cultural Task 
Analysis 
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In an attempt to better understand how culture might influence psychological 
processes, we propose a new framework called the cultural task analysis (Kitayama & 
Imada, in press-b). The main goal of this analysis is to understand how the cultural 
mandates such as independence and interdependence might influence and eventually 
shape various aspects of psychological processes. Any such effort must specify the nature 
of socio-cultural processes that link the collective or societal level reality, here 
represented by the cultural mandates, to psychological or personal level reality and vice 
versa. Moreover, any such analysis must be capable of illuminating the nature of cultural 
differences without assuming homogeneity in each of the cultures that are compared. In 
other words, it must be sensitive to both systematic cross-cultural variation and within-
culture variation among individuals.
1
 Here the notion of cultural task is proposed to 
address these theoretical concerns. 
Our proposal is illustrated in Figure 1. There are three key components in the 
cultural task analysis: cultural mandates, cultural tasks, and psychological tendencies. By 
cultural mandates, we mean the ideals or general goal states that are strongly sanctioned 
and encouraged by a given cultural group. These mandates are typically embodied in the 
culture’s philosophical traditions. Moreover, they are inscribed into the culture’s daily 
practices and public meanings. The cultural mandates are quite abstract and, as such, by 
themselves they do not offer specific routines or procedures that enable people to achieve 
the mandates. By cultural tasks, we mean such culturally scripted procedures or means by 
which to achieve the culture’s mandate. Cultural tasks are defined at the level of 
abstraction that is high enough to offer a comprehensive meaning for the action at issue 
in a particular social context and, yet, that is low enough to enable people to behave 
effectively in the context (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). In other words, cultural tasks are 
defined at the “basic” level of action identification.  
The cultural mandate of independence can be achieved by performing various 
tasks such as “expressing one’s unique self (Kim & Markus, 1999),” “personal goal 
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pursuit and self-promotion (Oishi & Diener, 2001),” and “maintaining high self-esteem 
(Crocker & Park, 2004).” Conversely, the cultural mandate of interdependence can be 
achieved by engaging in various tasks such as “being similar to others (Ohashi & 
Yamaguchi, 2004),” “self-effacement, self-criticism, and fitting-in (Kitayama, Markus, 
Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997)”, and “receiving respect and honor from others 
(Kitayama & Imada, in press-a).” Recent priming studies have used priming 
manipulations that mimics these “cultural tasks” and shown that they in fact are causally 
linked to independence and interdependence, respectively (Oyserman & Lee, 2007, 2008 
for a review and meta-analysis). There is reason to believe that these links are quite 
common across cultures.
2 
The last of the three key components of the cultural task analysis is the notion of 
psychological tendencies. By psychological tendencies we mean each individual’s mode 
of thinking, feeling, and acting. The psychological tendencies are grounded in biological 
potential and, yet, they are profoundly influenced by experience. Specifically, individuals 
in all cultures are likely to strive to be a “good” person by achieving the mandates of their 
own culture such as independence and interdependence (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & 
Kitayama, 1999). The cultural task analysis proposes that each individual seeks to 
achieve his or her culture’s mandate by actively and repeatedly engaging in one or more 
of the cultural tasks that are made available in the cultural context. The engagement with 
culture starts very early on in socialization and continues throughout life (Cole, 1996; 
Greenfield, et al., 2003; Greenfield, Maynard, & Childs, 2003; Keller, 2006; Lave & 
Wenger, 1991; Maynard & Greenfield, 2003; Rogoff, 2003; Rothbaum, Pott, Azuma, 
Miyake, & Weisz, 2000; Valsiner, 1989). The selected cultural tasks are carried out first 
with substantial effort; when repeated a number of times, however, the willful 
engagement in the cultural tasks will cause enduring changes in pertinent psychological 
processes and their underlying brain pathways (Schwartz & Begley, 2003). For most 
adults of any given cultural group, then, the resulting psychological tendencies will 
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become habitual (Wood & Neal, 2006) and automatic (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). We 
thus call these tendencies “implicit” and distinguish them from “explicit” beliefs about 
the self as independent or interdependent.  
Roughly speaking, by “implicit” tendencies, we mean how people habitually think, 
feel, and act. These tendencies therefore correspond closely to what Wood and Neal 
(2006) recently called habits. By “explicit” beliefs, in contrast, we mean what people 
believe themselves to be. The habitual mode of psychological operation is often tested by 
examining biases in responses to an explicit psychological instrument. These biases are 
called “implicit” here, not because the instrument is implicit (it is not), but because the 
biases result from one’s habits rather than from one’s explicit beliefs or goals (see De 
Houwer & Moors, 2007, for more nuanced differences among various tendencies that are 
referred to as “implicit”). These habitual or implicit tendencies may or may not be 
aligned closely with explicit personal beliefs about the self as independent or 
interdependent (Kitayama, 2002; Kitayama & Markus, 1999). 
We propose that various tasks linked to the mandate of independence such as self-
uniqueness, personal goal pursuit and self-promotion, and maintenance of high self-
esteem often require individuals to distinguish themselves from the social surroundings, 
focus attention on objects that are relevant to their personal goals, and make 
decontextualized decisions and judgments. In support of this proposal, the last two 
decades of cultural psychological research has suggested a number of psychological 
tendencies that are linked to independence. They include focused attention (Masuda & 
Nisbett, 2001), a tendency to experience disengaging rather than engaging emotions 
(Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006), a tendency to experience personal happiness 
(Kitayama et al., 2006), an expanded symbolic self (Duffy, Uchida & Kitayama, 2006), 
and a tendency to draw dispositional attributions (Morris & Peng, 1994).  
In contrast, various tasks linked to the mandate of interdependence such as “to be 
similar to others and be ordinary,” “self-criticism and fitting-in,” and “respect and honor” 
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are expected to encourage a contrasting set of psychological tendencies that tend to 
embed the self in the social setting, allocate one’s attention broadly to the social 
surrounding, and make decisions and judgments that are context-dependent and situation-
sensitive. The psychological tendencies linked with interdependence include attention 
(Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), a tendency to experience engaging emotions and social or 
interpersonal happiness (Kitayama et al., 2006), a more balanced symbolic self (Duffy et 
al., 2006), and a tendency to draw less dispositional attributions with a greater emphasis 
on situational constraints (Morris & Peng, 1994). 
The critical causal role of the cultural mandates such as independence and 
interdependence in fostering the respective set of psychological tendencies has been 
strongly suggested by a number of priming studies. Several different ways of priming 
independence or interdependence have been shown to increase many of the tendencies 
identified in the cross-cultural studies (Oyserman & Lee, 2007, for a review). For 
example, when reminded of one’s uniqueness, individuals tend to be more focused in 
attention (Kühnen, Hannover, & Schubert, 2001; Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002). 
Conversely, when reminded of one’s similarity to others, an opposite tendency toward 
holistic attention accrues.  
 One important shortcoming of the current priming literature stems from the fact 
that in any given study only one priming manipulation is used with respect to only one 
dependent measure. Thus, one cannot be certain about the extent to which the different 
ways to be independent or interdependent (i.e., cultural tasks) are in fact differentially 
linked to the pertinent psychological tendencies associated with independence and 
interdependence. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that exactly which psychological 
tendencies are fostered depends on the specific nature of the tasks one engages in. The 
cultural task analysis therefore assumes that any given cultural task of independence or 
interdependence is strongly linked only to a small subset of psychological tendencies that 
are generally associated with the respective cultural mandates of independence and 
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interdependence. For example, trying to be unique (an independent task) may increase 
attention focus (an independent psychological tendency), but doing so, by and in itself, 
may not necessarily increase dispositional attribution. Likewise, trying to be similar to 
others (an interdependent task) may increase holistic attention (an interdependent 
psychological tendency), but doing so may not necessarily increase situational attribution. 
By making this assumption, the cultural task analysis seeks to explain why individuals in 
any given group are often markedly different from one another and, yet, they appear 
simultaneously similar in terms of global markers of culture inscribed into their ways of 
thinking, feeling, and acting. To use a music metaphor, cultural mandates define 
“themes”, with cultural tasks adding to them a number of “variations.” 
Once psychological tendencies have become automatic and habitual, they become 
important elements of the cultural tasks, which in turn are embedded in a larger cultural 
network of practices and public meanings. Furthermore, a number of socio-cultural 
processes are always in operation to create new tasks, change or sometimes even dump 
old ones. For example, the cultural task of self-esteem maintenance is arguably old and 
well-rooted in American culture (James, 1890), which in turn can be traced back to some 
Western European sources including Protestantism (Crocker & Park, 2004), but it has 
attained a new emphasis and significance through the self-esteem movement of the 
1970’s and 1980’s (see e.g., Neuman, 1992, for the movement and a subsequent backlash 
on it). These socio-cultural processes that link individual agencies back to the 
maintenance and change of the collective level reality are also in the purview of the 
cultural task analysis. Yet, our emphasis in the present work is on the influence of 
cultural mandates on a variety of psychological tendencies associated with them. 
Psychological Tendencies Associated with Independence and Interdependence 
Cognitive tendencies of independence or interdependence. Whereas virtually all 
independent cultural tasks (e.g., self-initiatives, personal goal pursuit, being unique) are 
based on an assumption that individuals act on the basis of their own attitudes and 
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preferences, virtually all interdependent cultural tasks (e.g., conformity and obedience, 
social harmony, being similar) are based on a belief that people act in reference to norms 
and expectations. These contrasting beliefs are likely to bias social inferences. People 
chronically engaging in independent tasks should be more likely than those chronically 
engaging in interdependent tasks to infer that another person’s behavior is caused 
internally by the person’s dispositional characteristics such as attitudes and preferences, 
while ignoring potentially important external or situational determinants of the behavior.  
Cross-cultural evidence for this prediction is strong. Numerous studies have shown that 
the dispositional bias in social explanation is more pronounced among North Americans 
than among Asians (e.g., Kitayama, Ishii et al., 2006; Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994; 
see also Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999, for a review).
3
  
Engagement in different cultural tasks may also result in attention differences. 
Independent tasks often require pursuit of personal goals in lieu of other, contextual 
considerations and, as a consequence, people engaging in these tasks may develop a habit 
of focusing their attention to goal-relevant objects while ignoring other contextual cues. 
In contrast, interdependent tasks often require broad attention to the social surrounding, 
resulting in more holistic attention tendencies.  
Evidence is consistent with this reasoning, showing that such attention differences 
exist between members of North American cultures (where independence is highlighted) 
and Asian cultures (where interdependence is highlighted). Masuda and Nisbett (2001) 
found that when asked to describe what is happening in a video vignette of underwater 
scene, North Americans begin their story by pointing to focal (i.e., large and centrally 
located) fish and describing features of the fish. Only later do they mention features in the 
background. In contrast, Japanese are more likely to begin their story by referring to the 
background, describing the entire scene first and then moving on to mention the fish that 
are moving therein. The researchers also used a recognition memory task to show that 
whereas Americans tend to encode the focal fish separate from its background, Asians 
 12 
tend to encode the fish and its background as inherently connected.  Conceptually 
equivalent findings have subsequently been obtained with diverse measures including 
behavioral performance (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003; Masuda & 
Nisbett, 2001), eye movement (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005), and neurological 
measures such as electroencephalography (Lewis, Goto, Kong, & Lewenberg, 2008) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (Hedden, Ketay, Aron, Markus, & Gabrieli, 
2008). 
Emotional tendencies of independence and interdependence. Kitayama and 
colleagues have proposed that some emotions are related to success or failure of 
independence whereas some others are more pertinent to success or failure of 
interdependence (e.g., Kitayama & Park, 2007). Emotions such as pride in self and 
feelings of self-confidence result from success in achieving one’s independence, but 
emotions such as anger and frustration stem from an external interference with the goal of 
achieving independence. The researchers refer to these emotions as socially disengaging. 
In contrast, emotions such as feelings of connectedness and communal feelings result 
from a success in maintaining harmonious interdependence, whereas emotions such as 
guilt and shame stem from a failure to do so and subsequent effort to restore a much-
valued state of interdependence. These emotions are called socially engaging. One 
straightforward prediction would be that those chronically engaging in independent tasks 
should experience disengaging emotions (e.g., pride and anger) more and those 
chronically engaging in interdependent tasks should experience engaging emotions (e.g., 
friendly feelings and shame) more. This in fact is the case in recent studies that compared 
Americans and Japanese (Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006).  
Motivational tendencies of independence and interdependence. People who 
chronically and repeatedly engage in cultural tasks of independence or interdependence 
may be expected to acquire motivations toward the respective forms of the self. One 
relevant goal involves uniqueness or similarity of the self to others. As may be expected, 
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Kim and Markus (1999) have shown that Americans are much more likely than Asians 
and Asian Americans to prefer unique as opposed to conventional figures. Another 
relevant goal is to maintain self-esteem or social approval. Kitayama and colleagues have 
conducted a series of studies suggesting that both self-justification and intrinsic 
motivation are mediated by one’s desire to promote self-esteem in North America but by 
one’s desire to maintain social approval in Asia (see Kitayama & Imada, in press-a, for a 
review). 
The motivations toward either independence or interdependence have emotional 
consequences. Kitayama and Park (2007) pointed out that if one’s chronic goal is that of 
independence, the person’s happiness and well-being should be enhanced especially 
when some form of independence is achieved, whereas if his or her chronic goal is that of 
interdependence, his or her happiness and well-being should be enhanced especially 
when some form of interdependence is achieved. Using a diary method, Kitayama and 
colleagues (2006) found that Americans were more likely than Japanese to report 
happiness when they felt positive emotions associated with personal achievement and 
accomplishment (e.g., pride and feelings of self-esteem). Conversely, Japanese were 
more likely than Americans to report happiness when they felt positive emotions 
associated with harmonious social relations (e.g., friendly feelings and feelings of 
connection with others). 
Another potential consequence of the drive toward independence or 
interdependence has been investigated by Duffy et al. (2008). They argued that if 
individuals are motivated toward independence of the self, they symbolically inflate the 
representations of their personal self relative to those of others related to the self. To test 
this idea, Duffy and colleagues asked participants to draw a sociogram wherein circles 
are used to designate the self and others in their social network. Consistent with their 
analysis, the researchers found that North Americans consistently draw a larger circle for 
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the self than for their friends. As may be expected, this effect of symbolic self-inflation is 
much less and often non-existent among Japanese.  
The Present Study  
The growing body of evidence reviewed above shows that various aspects of 
implicit independence differentiate between North Americans and East Asians. As 
compared to East Asians, North Americans are more likely to show dispositional bias in 
attribution, to be focused (vs. holistic) in attention, to experience disengaging (vs. 
engaging) emotions, to experience personal (vs. social) happiness, and to exhibit an 
inflated symbolic self.  
So far, however, little is known on where Western Europeans are located on the 
continuum of implicit independence and interdependence. While North America owes 
substantial cultural heritage to Western Europe, American culture is distinct from 
European cultures in one key respect. Only American culture has undergone a history of 
settlement in a new continent and its western frontiers. Voluntary settlement is a highly 
independent undertaking, requiring a number of independent tasks such as self-
preservation and self-promotion (as opposed to altruistic helping and fitting in of the self 
to social expectations), personal initiative and success (as opposed to social conformity 
and social acceptance), and creativity and risk-taking (as opposed to anxiety over security 
and satisfaction in status quo). On the basis of these considerations, we may predict that 




We are cognizant of a notorious difficulty involved if we are to conclude that 
observed differences across cultures are due to a specific historical fact such as voluntary 
settlement. However, such reasoning can be made more plausible with triangulation 
(Kitayama, Ishii et al., 2006; Medin, Unsworth, & Hirschfeld, 2007). It will be important 
to use two different European groups and compare them with an American group. If we 
can find that the American group is more independent than the two European groups and, 
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further, if we can find that the two European groups are no different, any factors that are 
not shared between the two European groups will be less plausible candidates for 
explaining the difference between Americans and Europeans. Thus, the more dissimilar 
the two European countries are, the stronger a conclusion we will be able to reach.  
To this end, we chose the United Kingdom and Germany. While seen as typical of 
Western European nations, these two countries are quite distinct in terms of 1) ethnicity, 
2) language, 3) prevalence rates of specific denominations of Christianity, 4) geography 
and traditional forms of subsistence, and 5) institutional influences on the formation of 
the U.S. and the American culture.  
Finally, to enhance this design, we added Japanese from the mainland Japan as a 
control. We expected all the Western groups – including the two Western European 
groups – to be more independent or less interdependent than Japanese. 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 113 undergraduates from the University of Michigan, 166 
undergraduates from the University of Hamburg, Germany
5
, and 126 undergraduates 
from the University of Essex, the United Kingdom
6
. After excluding a small number of 
ethnic minorities, our final sample consisted of 94 European Americans (32 men and 62 
women, M age = 18.69), 125 Caucasian Germans (39 men, 84 women, and 2 unidentified, 
M age = 26.84), and 95 Caucasian British (12 men, 79 women, and 4 unidentified, M age 
= 20.53). In addition, 122 Japanese undergraduates were recruited. Among them, 90 were 
from Kyoto University (67 men, 25 women, and 8 unidentified, M age = 21.24) and the 
remaining 32 were from Tokyo Woman’s Christian University (all women, M age = 
20.07).  All participants completed the study for partial fulfillment of a course 
requirement. German participants were older on average than the rest. Preliminary 
analyses using age as a covariate showed no effect of age. 
Experimental Tasks 
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 Five psychological tendencies known to be associated with independence and 
interdependence were tested: 1. the degree of dispositional bias in social explanation, 2. 
focused vs. holistic attention, 3. salience of disengaging vs. engaging emotions, 4. 
personal vs. social correlates of happiness, and 5. symbolic self-inflation. These 
psychological tendencies are in large part habitual, non-self-reflective, automatic, and 
thus “implicit” because they have been internalized through repeated engagement in 
independent (as opposed to interdependent) tasks.  
All the materials were originally developed in English. Two Japanese-English 
bilinguals and two German-English bilinguals translated and back-translated the 
materials, respectively, in order to ensure that the English, Japanese, and German 
versions were comparable and equivalent in meaning. 
Dispositional bias in attribution. We used a measure of dispositional bias in social 
judgment (Kitayama, Ishii et al., 2006). Participants were presented with four vignettes. 
In two of the vignettes the protagonist engaged in a socially desirable behavior (e.g., a 
baseball player holding free baseball camps during his vacation), and in the remaining 
two the protagonist engaged in a socially undesirable behavior (e.g., a surgeon covering 
up a major medical mistake). After reading each vignette, participants indicated the 
extent to which they agreed with each of four statements: 1) features of the protagonist 
such as his/her character, attitude, or temperament influenced his/her behavior 
(dispositional attribution judgment), 2) features of the environment that surround the 
protagonist such as the atmosphere, social norms, or other contextual factors influenced 
his/her behavior (situational attribution judgment), 3) the protagonist would have acted 
differently if his/her dispositional features had been different (counterfactual 
dispositional judgment), and 4) the protagonist would have acted differently if features of 
his or her environment had been different (counterfactual situational judgment). Seven-
points rating scales were used (7 = strongly agree and 1 = strongly disagree). In each 
country we first collapsed the four stories and performed a factor analysis on the resulting 
 17 
mean scores for the four question items. After a varimax rotation, we found two factors in 
all cultures, with one represented by the two dispositional items (the statements 1 and 3) 
and the other one represented by the two situational items (the statements 2 and 4). Thus, 
we obtained means for the two sets of items. An independent tendency is indicated by a 
greater weight given to disposition relative to situation. 
Focused vs. holistic attention. We employed the Framed Line Task (FLT) 
(Kitayama et al., 2003). On the first page of an FLT booklet, participants were presented 
with a square with a line drawn in it. Participants looked at the framed line for five 
seconds and then moved to the next page, on which an empty square frame that was 
larger, smaller, or of the same as the first frame was shown. They drew a line that was the 
same as the first one in terms of either the absolute length (the absolute task) or the 
proportion of the line relative to the height of the respective squares (the relative task). 
The absolute task requires attention focused on the target line, whereas the relative task 
requires attention allocated broadly to both the target line and the surrounding square. 
They repeated the same task 9 times with different configurations of framed lines. The 
first 3 trials were practice, and the remaining 6 were the critical trials. The order of the 
two tasks was counterbalanced. Average error size (in mm) from the critical trials was 
analyzed. Errors were moderately correlated within each task. However, the alphas were 
no greater than .6 in all cases. Interpretation of the results from this task, therefore 
requires caution. 
Propensity to experience disengaging vs. engaging emotions. We used an Implicit 
Social Orientation Questionnaire (ISOQ, Kitayama & Park, 2007) to assess the extent to 
which socially disengaging emotions such as pride and anger (which are contingent on 
achieving independent, personal goals, or failing to achieve them) are experienced 
relative to their socially engaging counterparts such as friendly feelings and guilt (which 
are contingent on achieving interdependent, communal goals, or failing to achieve them). 
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Participants were given 10 mundane social situations. Some of the situations 
involved social relations (e.g., “having a positive interaction with friends”), some were 
related to study and work (e.g., “being overloaded with work”), and some others 
concerned daily hassles and bodily conditions of the self (e.g., “being caught in a traffic 
jam”). Participants were asked to remember the latest occasion when each of the 10 
situations happened to them. Then they were presented with a list of emotions and asked 
to report the extent to which they experienced those emotions in each situation. The 
emotions were either: 1) socially disengaging and positive (pride in self and feelings of 
superiority), 2) socially disengaging and negative (frustration and anger), 3) socially 
engaging and positive (feelings of connection with others and friendly feelings), or 4) 
socially engaging and negative (shame and guilt). Several additional emotion terms were 
used to measure well-being or general positive emotion (elated, happy, and calm) and 
negative well-being or general negative emotion (unhappy). Six-point scales were used 
(1= not at all and 6 = very strongly). 
To ensure that the meanings of the engaging and disengaging emotion terms are 
equivalent across cultures, we first obtained a mean intensity rating for each term across 
all the 10 situations for each participant. We then computed correlations among the 8 
positive or negative terms that are either engaging or disengaging. The resulting 
correlation matrix was subjected to a multidimensional scaling analysis. Replicating an 
earlier analysis by Kitayama, Markus, and Kurokawa (2001), this analysis showed two 
consistent dimensions in all the four countries. The first dimension was valence 
differentiating positive versus negative emotions and the second was social orientation 
differentiating engaging versus disengaging emotions. Because the results were no 
different across the four cultural groups, it is safe to assume that the meanings of the 
emotion terms were sufficiently equivalent.  
Our focus was on the extent to which disengaging (vis-à-vis engaging) emotions 
were experienced in situations that were matched in valence to the emotions (Kitayama et 
 19 
al., 2006). For each participant, we first determined the perceived valence of each of the 
10 situations. For each situation, the rating of the general negative emotion (unhappy) 
was subtracted from the average rating of the three general positive emotions (elated, 
happy, and calm). If the situation was positive (i.e., if the difference was positive), the 
average rating of disengaging positive emotions (e.g., pride in self) and the average rating 
of engaging positive emotions (e.g., friendly feelings) were obtained; conversely, if the 
situation was negative (i.e., if the difference was negative), the corresponding average 
ratings were obtained for the disengaging negative emotions (e.g., anger) and the 
engaging negative emotions (e.g., shame). We then averaged the index across the 10 
situations to yield an aggregate measure of the propensity to experience disengaging 
emotions and another aggregate measure of the propensity to experience engaging 
emotions. Reliabilities were high for both types of emotions, with alphas ≥ .64 in all the 
four samples. 
Personal vs. social correlates of happiness. We used the ISOQ for another purpose, 
namely to assess emotional consequences of motivation toward independence vs. 
interdependence. For each participant we assessed whether happiness was correlated 
more strongly with engaging positive emotions or with disengaging positive emotions. 
Separately for each participant, we first obtained the mean ratings for general positive 
emotion, disengaging positive emotion, and engaging positive emotion in each of the 10 
situations. Reliability of each of the three emotion types was obtained within each 
participant across the 10 situations. The average reliabilities across all participants in 
each of the four countries were high, with average alphas > .75. Engaging positive 
emotion and disengaging positive emotion were correlated, but still distinct (.45 < rs 
< .65). Next for each participant we regressed the average rating for general positive 
emotions on both the average rating of disengaging positive emotions and the average 
rating for engaging positive emotions across the 10 situations. The size of the resulting 
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unstandardized regression coefficients for disengaging emotions (or engaging emotions) 
is a measure of independence (or interdependence).  
Symbolic self-inflation. Participants drew their social network. They were asked 
to use circles to designate the self and friends, and lines to display the relationships 
among them (Duffy et al., 2008). They were given 5 minutes to complete the task. We 
first measured the horizontal diameter of all the circles. The relative size of the self circle 
in comparison to the average size of the circles for the friends is our measure of symbolic 
self-inflation. Greater symbolic self-inflation is a measure of independence (as opposed 
to interdependence). 
Singelis scale of independent and interdependent self-construal. In addition to the 
five measures of implicit psychological tendencies discussed above, we included the 
Singelis (1994) self-construal scale, which is one of the most commonly used belief-
based measures of independence and interdependence. Unlike the measures discussed 
above, the scale measures explicit beliefs of the self as independent or interdependent. 
These self-beliefs on independence and interdependence are known to be largely 
orthogonal. The scale is composed of 24 items. Half of the items assessed self-beliefs 
about independence (e.g., “I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or 
rewards”) and the other half assessed self-beliefs about interdependence (e.g., “It is 
important for me to maintain harmony within my group”). Participants reported their 
agreements on 5-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Reliabilities 
were adequate for both independence and interdependence, with alphas > .56 in all the 
four countries. 
Procedure 
In all locations, participants were tested in small groups of up to 6 people. They 
were tested in their respective native language. Upon arrival at the lab, participants were 
told that the study was about social relationship and cognitive style, and then each of 
them was given a booklet for the FLT. Following the FLT, they were given another 
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booklet containing the remaining tasks. They performed the sociogram task first, for 
which they were given 5 minutes to complete. They completed the rest of the tasks at 
their own pace. The attribution task, the ISOQ, and the Singelis self-construal scale were 
given in this order in Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. Because of time constraint, the 
ISOQ was omitted in Japan. Upon completion of the study, they were fully debriefed 
about the goal of the study and thanked for their participation. 
Although the ISOQ was not included in Japan, Kitayama, Mesquita, and 
Karasawa (2006; Study 2) administered an expanded version of the current ISOQ to 55 
college students in Kyoto University (20 males and 35 females). Because the current 
ISOQ was a subset of the ISOQ used by Kitayama and colleagues (2006), we could 
obtain pertinent measures by using the relevant subset of the data from this study. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 We expected that the three Western groups (Americans, British, and Germans) 
would be more independent (or less interdependent) than Japanese in all measures of 
implicit independence and interdependence. Of greater relevance to the present study, we 
expected that Americans would be generally more independent (or less interdependent) 
than both Germans and British. We had no a priori reason to expect any differences 
between the two European groups. In all analyses, gender was included as an additional 
factor to explore possible gender differences. No gender effects proved statistically 
significant in all analyses. Although women are often shown to be more interdependent 
or less independent than men, this demonstration is often based on self-belief measures of 
independence and interdependence (Cross & Madson, 1997). It appears that in the 
measures of implicit independence and interdependence, culture plays a much more 
potent role than gender. 
Implicit Psychological Tendencies of Independence and Interdependence 
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Dispositional bias in attribution. The mean dispositional and situational scores are 
summarized in Figure 2. A 4 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with country and gender as between-
subjects factors and causal locus as a within-subjects factor showed a significant main 
effect of causal locus, F (1, 414) = 320.52, p < .001. As predicted, however, this effect 
was qualified by country, F (3, 414) = 13.13, p < .001. In all groups, the dispositional 
score was higher than the situational score. Yet, this difference was quite pronounced in 
the three Western groups, t (93) = 11.35, t (90) = 13.12, t (122) = 12.73, ps < .001, for 
Americans, British, and Germans, respectively. There was no difference among the three 
Western groups, ts ≤ 1.14. The same tendency was weaker in Japan than each of the three 
Western groups, t (206) = 4.93, t (203) = 5.56, t (235) = 4.80, ps < .001, for comparisons 
with Americans, British, and Germans, respectively, although the dispositional bias was 
still significant in Japan, t (113) = 4.80, p < .001.  
We replicated the previously observed cross-cultural variation in dispositional 
bias, with Americans showing a stronger bias than Japanese. In this measure, the two 
European groups were no different from Americans. 
Focused vs. holistic attention. The average errors for each of the two FLT tasks 
(i.e., absolute vs. relative) were submitted to a 4 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with country and 
gender as between-subjects factors and task type as a within-subjects factor. Overall, the 
error was greater in the absolute task than in the relative task, F (1, 410) = 92.44, p < .001. 
Yet, this effect was qualified by a significant interaction between task type and country, F 
(3, 410) = 10.62, p < .001. As shown in Figure 3, the greater accuracy in the relative (vs. 
absolute) task was most pronounced in Japan, least so in the U.S., with the two European 
groups falling in-between. A contrast representing the task type x country interaction was 
computed for all country pairs. The Japanese pattern was significantly or marginally 
significantly different from each of the three Western patterns (p = .001, p = .07, and p 
< .001 when compared with Germany, the U.K., and the U.S., respectively). The U.S. 
pattern was also significantly different from the pattern of each of the remaining three 
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countries (p = .005, p < .025, and p < .001 when compared with the U.K., Germany, and 
Japan, respectively). Finally, there was no difference between the two European countries 
(F = 1.17, n.s.). 
With the FLT, we found that Americans are relatively more focused or less 
holistic in attention than Japanese. This is in line with the earlier cross-cultural difference 
in attention between Japanese and Americans (Kitayama et al., 2003; Masuda & Nisbett, 
2001). Of note, Americans were less holistic in attention than Europeans. We found no 
difference between British and Germans. 
Propensity to experience disengaging vs. engaging emotions. The mean reported 
intensities of experiencing disengaging and engaging emotions are summarized in Table 
1. These scores were submitted to a 4 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with country and gender as 
between-subjects factors and emotion type as a within-subjects factor. Main effects of 
both emotion type and country were significant, F (1, 355) = 9.80, p < .005 and F (3, 
355) = 28.95, p < .001, respectively. Further, as predicted, the interaction between 
emotion type and country also proved significant, F (3, 355) = 24.15, p < .001.  
To determine the relative intensity of experiencing disengaging vs. engaging 
emotions, we subtracted the mean intensity score for engaging emotions from the 
corresponding score for disengaging emotions. These difference scores are shown in 
Figure 4. An ANOVA performed on these means show a significant main effect of 
country, F (3, 355) = 16.54, p < .001. The Japanese mean was significantly smaller than 
each of the two European means, which in turn were significantly smaller than the 
American mean (all ps ≤ .01). The two European means were no different from one 
another, t (212) = .82, n.s.  The Japanese mean was significantly negative (M = .47), t 
(54) = 5.05, p < .001, meaning that Japanese reportedly experienced engaging emotions 
more than disengaging emotions. In contrast, all three Western means were positive (Ms 
= .16, .23, and .53), t (122) = 2.54, t (90) = 3.32, and t (93) = 7.64 for Germans, British, 
and Americans, ps ≤ .01. Thus, Western participants reportedly experienced disengaging 
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emotions more than engaging emotions, although this tendency was significantly stronger 
for Americans than for Europeans. 
 Personal vs. social correlates of happiness. We expected that people motivated 
toward independence should feel happy when they achieve independent goals. 
Conversely, people motivated toward interdependence should feel happy when they 
achieve interdependent goals. For each participant we regressed the average intensity for 
general positive emotions on both the average intensity for disengaging positive emotions 
and the average intensity for engaging positive emotions over the 10 situations. The mean 
unstandardized regression coefficients (Bs) for disengaging positive emotion and 
engaging positive emotion were submitted to a 4 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with country and 
gender as between-subjects factors and emotion type as a within-subjects factor. 
As predicted, an emotion type x country interaction was significant, F (3, 350) = 
4.43, p = .005. Gender showed no significant effects. Table 2 displays mean Bs. To 
determine the relative size of the two Bs, we subtracted the B for engaging emotions from 
the B for disengaging emotions and analyzed this difference score. As shown in Figure 5, 
the Japanese mean was negative (M = −.38), t (49) = 2.70, p = .01, indicating that their 
happiness depended more on social engagement than on social disengagement. The mean 
difference score was still marginally negative for Germans (M = −.15), t (122) = 1.79, p 
= .08, but became no different from zero for British (M = .00), t (90) < 1, n.s. It was 
significantly positive for Americans (M = .16), t (93) = 2.30, p < .025, meaning that their 
happiness depended more on social disengagement than on social engagement. Simple 
effect analysis suggested that the Japanese mean was different from the U.K. mean, t 
(139) = 2.53, p = .01 and the U.S. mean, t (142) = 3.84, p < .001, but not from the 
German mean, t (171) = 1.49, p > .10. The American mean was different from the 
German mean, t (215) = 2.75, p < .01, and the Japanese mean, t (142) = 3.84, p < .001, 
but not from the U.K. mean, t (183) = 1.51, p > .10. As expected, the two European 
means were no different from one another, t (212) = 1.26, p > .20. 
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Because the ISOQ was originally developed in the U.S. and Japan, its measures 
may contain a greater amount of noise when used outside of these two countries. Should 
this be the case, the means would be expected to be more moderate for the two Western 
European countries, relative to those of either the U.S. or Japan. To examine this 
explanation, we computed the amount of variance explained in the foregoing regressions. 
The R
2
 was obtained for each participant and averaged in each of the countries. The 
average R
2
 was largest in the U.K. (.78), followed by the U.S. (.73) and Germany (.64), 
with Japan showing the smallest value (.63). Unlike what might have been expected, R
2
 
was not higher in the U.S. and Japan where the instrument had been originally developed 
and validated. As a further step, we computed correlations between the size of the 
regression coefficient for the disengaging emotions relative to the size of the coefficient 
for the engaging emotions and the R
2
. The correlations were negligible in all the four 
countries. Thus the cross-cultural variation in the reliability of the measures used here 
appears to have little to do with the cross-cultural pattern in the correlates of happiness.  
Symbolic self-inflation. The width of the circles designated one’s friends was 
averaged for each participant and then subtracted from the width of the self-circle so that 
higher numbers represent a greater symbolic self-inflation. A 4 x 2 ANOVA with country 
and gender as between-subjects factors showed a significant main effect of country, F (3, 
400) = 14.87, p < .001.
7
 Relevant means are displayed in Figure 6. The Japanese mean 
was no different from 0 (M = −.44), t (104) = .76, n.s. In contrast, the German (M = 4.45), 
the British (M = 3.00), and the American means (M = 6.22) were all significantly greater 
than 0, t (119) = 6.01, t (89) = 3.84, and t (92) = 6.53, ps < .001. The American mean was 
significantly greater than the British mean, t (181) = 2.60, p = .01. The German mean fell 
between the two, with no significant difference from either of the two countries, t (208) = 
1.33 and t (211) = 1.49 for comparisons with the U.K. and the U.S., respectively.
8
 When 
Germany and the U.K. were grouped together and compared against the U.S., the 
difference was significant, t (301) = 2.32, p < .025. We replicated an earlier finding on a 
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U.S.-Japan difference (Duffy et al., 2008). Moreover, we found that the symbolic self 
tends to be smaller in the two European countries than in the U.S. 
The Findings So Far: Implicit Psychological Tendencies of Independence and 
Interdependence 
 The findings so far are summarized in Table 3. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) are also 
reported for all pertinent comparisons on each measure. The overarching pattern is clear. 
Americans are most independent (or least interdependent) and Japanese are most 
interdependent (or least independent). The effect size here is moderate to large (.67 ≤ ds ≤ 
1.47). Europeans tended to fall in-between. In no case were the two European groups 
significantly different from one another. In fact, the average effect size here was virtually 
zero (= .02). Western Europeans tended to be different from both Americans and 
Japanese in all measures except for dispositional bias, which was equally strong in the 
three Western groups (ds ≤ .16). All predicted differences reached statistical significance, 
except in two isolated cases, in which the difference between one of the  
Western European groups and the U.S. failed to reach statistical significance (U.K. in the 
measure of personal vs. social happiness, Germany in the measure of symbolic self-
inflation). Finally, in all measures, the three western groups were significantly more 
independent or less interdependent than Japanese, as expected. 
Explicit Self-Belief Measure of Independence and Interdependence 
 The mean independence and interdependence scores from the Singelis scale are 
reported in Table 4. A 4 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with country and gender as between-subjects 
factors and scale type as a within-subjects factor showed a significant interaction between 
scale type and country, F (3, 414) = 14.71, p < .001. In contrast to the highly systematic 
pattern observed for the measures of implicit psychological tendencies, the pattern of the 
explicit measure was anomalous at best. The independence subscale shows that Germans 
are the most independent, and British were the least so. The interdependence subscale 
also shows an equally puzzling pattern, with Americans coming out as the most 
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interdependent and Japanese as the least so. Although the two subscales are only loosely 
correlated, especially in many instances in daily life that require individuals to choose 
between independent and interdependent courses of action, it may be the relative strength 
of the two tendencies more than anything else that matters. We therefore subtracted the 
interdependence score from the independence score to see the relative degree of 
independence. Germans proved to be most independent of the four groups (.57), followed 
by Japanese (.30). Curiously Americans (-.01) and British (.00) were virtually no 
different and least independent. The contrasts comparing Germans to Japanese, Japanese 
to Americans, and Japanese to British showed statistical significance (ps < .005).  
Correlations among the Measures 
The correlations among all the pertinent measures were computed within each 
country. They are summarized in Tables 5-A, B, C, and D for Americans, British, 
Germans, and Japanese, respectively. In this analysis, the two subscale scores from the 
Singelis scale were first employed and then the difference score was examined. The 
pattern was no different.
9
 In these tables, the results for the difference score are reported. 
Note also that the measures derived from the ISOQ are missing from the current Japanese 
dataset.  
What is the most remarkable here is the absence of any systematic patterns of 
correlations. There were sporadic correlations that were statistically significant; but they 
were never replicated in other countries. Twenty seven out of 51 correlations were 
positive and 24, negative. In fact, the overall mean correlation across all the four 
countries was .01. Overall, then, this resonates with other recent studies showing similar 
lack of within-culture correlations among measures of independence/interdependence and 
its cognitive counterpart of analytic vs. holistic mode of thought (Lan, Park, & Kitayama, 
2009; Na, Varnum, Grossmann, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2009; see also Kashima, in press; 
Shweder, 1973 for similar observations). Of importance, Lan and colleagues (2009) 
administered the same set of tasks as the ones used in the present study to a group of 
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41Chinese students twice with an interval of approximately three weeks and found that 
each of the measures shows a substantial test-retest reliability. Hence, the measures used 
here are quite reliable in assessing the pertinent psychological tendencies of each 
participant.
10 
Paradoxically, then, the measures of implicit psychological tendencies do not 
cohere together within each culture despite the fact that each of them is reliability 
capturing what it is designed to capture and, moreover, that they do cohere highly 
systematically across cultures. In epidemiology and related areas, this paradox has long 
been acknowledged as the Simpson’s paradox (Tu, Gunnell, & Gilthorpe, 2008). More 
generally, when multiple levels are involved in statistical analysis, there is no reason to 
believe that an association between two variables at one level (e.g., at the cross-cultural 
or collective level) is to be replicated at another level (e.g., at the within-cultural or 
individual-level) (see Vijver, Hermert, & Poortinga, 2008 for discussions on multilevel 
analysis of individuals and cultures). However, merely naming it does not do much by 





Western Civilization and Voluntary Settlement 
 Are Western Europeans and North Americans similar or different in implicit 
psychological features that constitute independence and interdependence? Here we 
reported the first systematic investigation into this question. We found that North 
Americans are systematically more independent than Germans and British in all the 
implicit psychological tendencies tested except for dispositional bias in attribution: North 
Americans were more likely than Western Europeans to focus attention to an object, 
experience disengaging rather than engaging emotions, associate happiness with personal 
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achievement rather than social harmony, and show a greater self-inflation. Future work 
should test different populations sampled from different locations in each country to 
establish the generality of the present findings. 
 Interpretation of the U.S.-Western Europe difference observed here is enhanced 
by the fact that in no cases were the two Western European groups (Germany and the 
U.K.) different from one another. This substantially reduces the plausibility of the factors 
that are not shared in the two countries (e.g., ethnicity, language, geography, prevalence 
rates of specific denominations of Christian Church, and earlier institutional influences 
on the U.S. among others) as responsible for the U.S.-Western Europe difference. This in 
turn makes more compelling our contention that the difference is due, at least in part, to 
one historical fact that is applicable only to Americans, namely, the history of voluntary 
settlement. This interpretation receives further support from a recent study that examines 
a Japanese group that went through a recent history of settlement in a frontier in Japan’s 
northern territory (Kitayama, Ishii et al., 2006). This study finds strong implicit 
tendencies of independence in this group. Future work should examine other voluntary 
settlers in the world to assess the generality of the hypothesis.  
 The present work also included mainland Japanese as a control group. It is 
noteworthy that in all the implicit psychological tendencies, Japanese were more 
interdependent or less independent than Western Europeans. This extends the existing 
cultural psychological work and shows that the East-West differences are likely to be 
observed even when the West is represented by Western Europeans. The two distinct 
intellectual and cultural traditions of West and East appear to exercise formative 
influences on implicit psychological tendencies of independence and interdependence. By 
extension, it is reasonable to suggest that the dominant mentality of the contemporary 
white European Americans can be traced back to two important factors: Western cultural 
tradition and voluntary settlement. 
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 Why are European Americans no more dispositional than Western Europeans in 
attribution? The absence of any difference in this measure is notable because the U.S.-
Western Europe difference was consistently observed in all the remaining implicit 
psychological tendencies. One conjecture is that dispositional bias as measured by the 
present instrument was caused by cultural knowledge that is available throughout 
Western civilization and, yet, this knowledge might be relatively detached from mundane 
and realistic socio-cultural tasks, such as self-promotion, self-initiative, and personal 
achievement, that make American culture unique relative to its Western European 
counterpart. One might then expect the predicted difference between the U.S. and 
Western Europe if dispositional judgments are couched in highly realistic and ego-
involving episodes (e.g., adventure, risk taking, entrepreneurship). This possibility must 
be tested in future work.  
What’s “Wrong” with the Explicit Self-Beliefs of Independence and Interdependence? 
 In stark contrast to the highly systematic group differences observed for the 
measures psychological tendencies of independence and interdependence, the explicit 
measure of independence and interdependence used here (the Singelis scale) yielded 
findings that are neither systematic nor readily interpretable. In this measure, Germans 
were more independent than the two remaining Western groups (Americans and British). 
It is not clear why. Even more perplexingly, however, Japanese fell between Germans 
and the remaining two Western groups.  
Several researchers have argued that explicit self-belief measures often lack cross-
cultural validity (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Kitayama, 2002). The 
anomaly found here appears congruous with this general point. This said, however, the 
finding here is curiously consistent with recent reviews of cross-cultural studies that use 
similar explicit self-belief scales. Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) observed 
that Americans are, in general, more independent and less interdependent than many 
other cultural groups of the world. Yet, the researchers quickly noted that this 
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generalization cannot be taken too far because there are too many exceptions to the 
generalization. For example, as in the present results, Japan came out as much less 
collectivistic or less interdependent than many other countries even including the U.S. 
Even more puzzlingly, some other studies show the “expected” cultural differences at 
least in some respects (e.g., Noguchi, 2007; Schimmack, Oishi, and Diener , 2005), 
indicating the cross-cultural differences themselves are somewhat unstable. Further, 
variations within any single region or even within any given country can be quite 
substantial, calling into question the replicability of many of the findings. Matsumoto 
(1999) and Takano and Osaka (1999) have also expressed similar skepticisms on the 
notions of independence and interdependence. These researchers also relied nearly 
exclusively on existing evidence regarding explicit self-beliefs on independence and 
interdependence.  
 In view of the present evidence, the skepticisms expressed by Matsumoto, 
Oyserman, Takano and their colleagues are justified. One important caveat, however, is 
that a contrastingly systematic cultural variation can be found in implicit psychological 
tendencies and, here, the notions of independence and interdependence are crucially 
important. 
How can we understand the dramatic discrepancy between the measures of 
implicit psychological tendencies and those of explicit self-beliefs? The cultural task 
analysis of independence and interdependence might help. As illustrated in Figure 1, we 
maintain that cultures vary in terms of the repertoire of cultural tasks that have been 
created and accumulated therein over the course of history (Kitayama, 2002; Kitayama & 
Markus, 1999). Moreover, these cultural tasks require and thus foster a variety of habitual 
psychological tendencies. In general, tasks of independence are much more likely than 
tasks of interdependence to afford habitual psychological tendencies that separate and 
disengage the self, such as focused attention, dispositional bias, disengaging emotion, 
personal happiness, and inflated self. For those who repeatedly engage in the pertinent 
 32 
cultural tasks, the corresponding psychological tendencies will be well rehearsed, become 
automatized and habitual, and thus implicit.  
Notice, however, that explicit beliefs of the self may rarely be involved in either 
the acquisition or the operation of the implicit psychological tendencies. Developmental 
evidence strongly suggests that basic implicit personal and interpersonal inclinations 
toward independence or interdependence are inculcated very early on, even before school 
age, through various parenting practices (Keller, 2007; Rothbaum et al., 2000). The 
explicit beliefs of independence and interdependence will be formed only afterward 
under the influence of a number of haphazard factors. For example, many young people 
in contemporary Japan may be wedded to a “Western” idea of individualism (Matsumoto, 
1999; Oyserman et al., 2002); yet, this explicit belief may be acquired during adolescence 
or even later, quite independent of their earlier socialization that makes them to think, 
feel, and act in highly interdependent fashion. This explains why cross-cultural variation 
in explicit beliefs about the self’s independence and interdependence is much less 
systematic and thus more unpredictable than the corresponding variation in implicit 
psychological tendencies of independence and interdependence.  
When a Coherent Construct Fails to Cohere 
 Another noteworthy finding comes from correlations among the measures of 
independence and interdependence. The correlations among the measures of implicit 
psychological tendencies of independence or interdependence were virtually zero within 
each culture. According to a central principle of psychometrics (Allen & Yen, 2002), this 
demonstrates that the concepts of independence and interdependence are not “real.” 
Notice that the explicit self-belief measures of independence and interdependence 
typically show reasonably high inter-item correlations, that is, they are reasonably 
reliable. So, paradoxically, the same concepts (i.e., independence and interdependence) 
appear “coherent” and thus “real” when assessed explicitly in terms of self-beliefs, but 
not so when assessed implicitly in terms of habitual psychological tendencies. Moreover, 
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the same set of implicit psychological tendencies differentiated among the cultural groups 
in highly systematic fashion. As may be predicted, each of the measures of implicit 
tendencies was demonstrably reliable (Lan et al., 2009). Thus, equally paradoxically, 
when assessed in terms of implicit or habitual psychological tendencies, the constructs 
appear “coherent” and “real” at the cross-cultural, collective level, but they appear not so 
at the within-culture, individual level. As mentioned earlier, this is a special case of the 
Simpson’s paradox (Tu et al., 2008; Vijver et al., 2008).  
How can we resolve the two paradoxes noted here? Again the cultural task 
analysis might prove useful (see Figure 1). We maintain that in adapting to their own 
cultural context, people are motivated to be independent or interdependent in accordance 
with the overarching mandate of the culture. Further, they do so by performing various 
cultural tasks of the relevant kind. However, it is very unlikely that any single person 
whole-heartedly takes up and performs all pertinent tasks available in his or her culture. 
Aside from the fact that there are too many relevant cultural tasks for any single 
individual to perform (see Shweder, 1973 for additional reasons), the underlying 
motivation for the person to engage in cultural tasks is to affirm the status of the self as 
living up to the standard or the mandate of the culture. From this person’s point of view, 
available cultural tasks represent alternative means or procedures to attain his or her 
culture’s mandate of the self as independent or interdependent. The person may therefore 
become independent or interdependent in his or her own way. This means that specific 
features that define independence or interdependence should vary from one individual to 
the next within any given cultural group. For example, Tom, an American, may seek to 
be independent by being a unique person, but Nancy, another American, may do so by 
aggressively pursuing her personal goals and ambitions. Likewise, Takeshi, a Japanese, 
may seek to be interdependent by being an ordinary person, but Naoko, another Japanese, 
may do so by being self-effacing and fitting-in to her primary groups. As noted earlier, 
this feature of the cultural task analysis enabled us to simultaneously explain both 
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cultural “themes” and individual “variations”, integrating global similarities and 
relatively specific differences among members of the cultural group. 
Which tasks people choose for the sake of realizing or living up to their culture’s 
mandate is likely to depend on myriad factors including specific styles of early 
socialization one receives, situational priming one is repeatedly exposed to, and social 
networks one develops (Cantor, 1994). Furthermore, all these factors are embedded in 
macro, societal, or collective-level contexts such as social class, ecology, and political 
and economic conditions among others (e.g., Berry, 1976; Greenfield et al., 2003; 
Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Kitayama & Markus, 1994, 1999; Oyserman & Lee, 2007; 
Triandis, 1995; Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008). Thus, clearly much more has to be 
learned on the specific processes involved in how engagement in cultural tasks of 
independence or interdependence may actually transform various psychological processes.  
Nevertheless, two important implications of the cultural task analysis should be 
clear. First, various psychological tendencies required by cultural tasks of independence 
(e.g., focused attention, activation of disengaging emotions, big symbolic self, etc.) will 
be internalized more by members of Western cultural contexts. Conversely, various 
psychological tendencies required by cultural tasks of interdependence (e.g., holistic 
attention, activation of engaging emotions, small symbolic self, etc.) will be internalized 
more by members of Eastern cultures. Second, exactly which of the relevant 
psychological tendencies are acquired and internalized by any given member of the 
respective cultures should depend on his or her idiosyncratic ways in which to realize the 
pertinent cultural mandates of independence and interdependence. Accordingly, whatever 
associations there might be among different features of independence or interdependence 
would be minimal within a given culture even when cultures vary systematically, on 
aggregate, at the collective level, on the very dimensions defined by these psychological 
features. Moreover, this is the case even when the constructs themselves are clearly 
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recognized as meaningful and coherent as the level of individual beliefs. The two 
paradoxes noted above have thus begun to dissolve.  
In short, the key finding here is that the constructs of independence and 
interdependence fail to cohere when assessed in terms of implicit psychological 
tendencies. Although seemingly paradoxical at first glance, the zero correlations among 
implicit psychological tendencies can be interpreted as a necessary consequence of the 
process of culture-mind interaction that is postulated by the cultural task analysis. This 
analysis assumes that individuals seek to achieve their culture’s mandate of independence 
or interdependence in highly idiosyncratic fashion. Because which psychological 
tendencies they may acquire and internalize over the years of socialization depend on the 
specific ways in which they continuously and repeatedly seek to achieve the mandate, 
different sets of psychological tendencies may eventually be acquired as the defining 
feature, or the “signature”, of independence or interdependence for different individuals. 
In other words, there may be substantial individual differences in the “profile” of how to 
practice independence or interdependence and how to put these cultural mandates into 
action even though the individuals in a given cultural group are likely to share the 
commitment to their culture’s mandate (see Mischel & Shoda, 1995 for a similar analysis 
on personality).  
We thus believe that while not fully anticipated, the zero correlations reported in 
Tables 5-A through D offer rather unique empirical support for the cultural task analysis. 
Future work must explore further implications of this conceptualization of the mutual 
influences between cultural mandates and psychological processes. 
Knowledge-Activation Approach to Culture: Is It Viable? 
 One approach that has attracted considerable research attention in recent years as 
an explanation of cultural differences in psychological processes highlights the notion of 
knowledge-activation (Oyserman & Lee, 2007, 2008; see also e.g., Bargh, 2006; Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000; Higgins, 1996 for reviews). By no means, this approach is monolithic. 
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Nevertheless, this theoretical approach typically assumes that the constructs of 
independence and interdependence are linked to an array of behavioral characteristics and, 
as a consequence, once activated, these constructs cause the associated behavioral 
characteristics to show up. As Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, Chen, and Sannum (in press) 
observed, researchers working within this research tradition typically assume that “when 
an independent or interdependent self concept is cued, the relevant procedures are also 
cued (p. 51).” According to this view, cultures are different in terms of the likelihood 
with which situations (primes) activate either independence or interdependence, resulting 
in the corresponding behavioral differences. North Americans, for example, show a 
variety of independent behaviors because these behaviors are linked to the construct of 
independence, which in turn is chronically primed by a variety of practices and artifacts 
available in this cultural context. Notably, this approach can account for situational 
variations as a function of the availability of different primes (Bargh, Lombardi, & 
Higgins, 1988). It therefore is capable of explaining both systematic cultural differences 
and within-culture individual differences within a single theoretical framework. The most 
important contribution of this approach is to show that how people think, feel, and act can 
be quite malleable across situations. As Oyserman and colleagues (in press) note, 
“cultural mindsets can be relatively easily shifted (p. 52).” 
 Nevertheless, the current data presents some significant challenges to the 
knowledge-activation approach as a comprehensive account of cultural variations in 
psychological processes. The knowledge-activation approach starts with the assumption 
that individuals who endorse the mandate of independence (or interdependence) will do 
so because they are exposed to various situations (primes) that encourage independence 
(or interdependence) (see Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999 for evidence). Typically, this 
approach is couched within a spreading activation model of long-term memory 
(Anderson, 1983). Thus, it would hold that the chronic activation of the construct of 
independence or interdependence is linked systematically to corresponding psychological 
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differences across cultures. One implication of this theorizing is that there should be a 
strong link between the degree to which the mandate is endorsed (the explicit self-belief 
measures of independence or interdependence) and the corresponding implicit 
psychological tendencies. This clearly was not the case in our data. The knowledge 
activation paradigm would have to make additional assumptions to accommodate the 
present findings. One could argue, for example, that explicit responses are influenced by 
numerous superfluous factors such as self-presentational concerns and response sets, 
thereby disturbing the otherwise systematic correspondence between the mandate and the 
corresponding psychological tendencies (e.g., Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). While 
plausible, it is not clear if this is always the case.  
More importantly, the spreading activation theory of semantic memory holds that 
memory activation spreads spontaneously and automatically from the higher-order node 
(i.e., a mandate) to the lower-order features (psychological tendencies linked to the 
mandate) (Anderson, 1983). A straightforward prediction would be that the activation of 
the cultural mandate would lead to the activation of all of the associated psychological 
tendencies. One may then expect high degrees of coherence among the pertinent 
psychological tendencies.
11
 Moreover, from these standard postulates of the knowledge-
activation approach, it would also follow that the implicit psychological tendencies and 
the explicit self-beliefs show the same cross-cultural pattern. Again, both of the 
predictions were contradicted by the data. Clearly, something is amiss.  
 Together, while we believe that various important effects do occur as a function 
of knowledge activation and, moreover, they can sometimes be implicated in a variety of 
cultural differences that are observed, we also contend that very different mechanisms are 
required to account for the relatively enduring cross-cultural variations in implicit 
psychological tendencies of independence and interdependence. The cultural task 
analysis offers a theoretical framework that plausibly explains the very phenomena that 
pose serious difficulties to the knowledge-activation approach: This new framework 
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implies, first, that there can be a strong dissociation between the explicit self-beliefs and 
the corresponding implicit tendencies. Second, the implicit tendencies, in principle, are 
unlikely to cohere together even when the corresponding self-beliefs are highly coherent 
and, finally, the cultural differences observed in the implicit tendencies need not be 
duplicated in the corresponding self-beliefs. 
Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Culture and the Mind 
 It is important to note that the process depicted in Figure 1 is socio-cultural and 
collective in nature. This process involves behaviors which different members of a 
cultural group engage in (i.e., cultural tasks) as they pursue their culture’s mandate. 
These behaviors, in turn, are assumed to result, over time through repeated engagement in 
them, in a variety of psychological tendencies. According to this view, both tasks and 
psychological correlates of independence or interdependence are socially and collectively 
distributed. In particular, individuals shown in Figure 1 are very different in terms of both 
1) the specific tasks of independence or interdependence they perform and 2) the specific 
psychological tendencies they exhibit. Yet, when many such individuals are aggregated 
in a collective within a cultural group, a clearly patterned correspondence emerges 
between cultural mandates and psychological tendencies.  
 In this crucial respect, the cultural task analysis departs substantially from and, 
thus, likely complements social cognitive theories of culture including the knowledge-
activation approach discussed above. Although diverse, the social cognitive theories 
share an important premise that knowledge associated with independence or 
interdependence is “packed in the head.” Again our position is that both approaches are 
correct. On the one hand, we believe that knowledge pertaining to independence or 
interdependence is in fact acquired through socialization and can be “packed in the head” 
to varying extents. As suggested by numerous priming studies, this knowledge in turn can 
mediate the observed fluctuation of psychological behaviors across variable situations. 
On the other hand, we also maintain that to understand the nature of relatively chronic 
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cultural differences, a socio-cultural, collective process must be taken into account. This 
collective process motivates members of a cultural group to pursue their cultural mandate 
through engagement in pertinent cultural tasks. We, in fact, suspect that further 
examinations of this collective process may be the key in understanding how the 
knowledge on independence or interdependence is acquired and cognitively represented 
to begin with. 
Concluding Comment 
 In his characteristically astute observation, Bob LeVine (1977, p. 17) once noted 
that “[the ways of social life including parenting] are ‘rational’ in that they contain 
information about environmental contingencies previously experienced by the population 
and assimilated into its cultural tradition” (see Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Campbell, 1975; 
Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, for related “functionalist” proposals; see also Kashima, 2000 
for a review). Importantly, however, there is no reason to expect that such contingencies 
are transparent to the current residents of the culture at issue. More often than not, the 
contingencies inherent in any given cultural tradition are not consciously recognized, 
much less articulated by the members of the culture. LeVine, therefore, pointed out a 
need to empirically unpack “the adaptive component concealed in [cultural] practices” (p. 
17) if one is to fully understand the current form of any given culture and its future 
prospect for change.  
Informed by the cultural task analysis, we offer three specific contributions to add 
to the crucial insight brought forward by the prominent cultural anthropologist. First, the 
voluntary settlement hypothesis is our way to address the nature of pervasive 
“environmental contingencies.” Second, the experimental tasks we have devised to assess 
implicit independence and interdependence may prove useful in further investigations 
into psychological effects of these contingencies. Last, but not the least, we showed that 
the environmental contingencies are inscribed into psychological systems. In particular, 
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the frontier is still alive and well on the mind of individuals engaging in the 
contemporary American culture. 
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    Footnotes 
 
 1
 One prominent approach that deals with the issue of cross-cultural and within-
culture variation is based on the notion of knowledge activation (Oyserman & Lee, 2007, 
2008; see also Higgins, 1996). This approach assumes that any cultural context provides 
a number of priming stimuli that chronically activate knowledge associated with the core 
value of the culture (e.g., independence or interdependence). These priming stimuli also 
temporarily change the activation levels across situations and over time. The activation of 
knowledge is then assumed to lead to a variety of cognitive, motivational, emotional, and 
behavioral responses linked to the knowledge. This approach presupposes the existing 
linkages between the knowledge of, say, independence or interdependence and the host of 
psychological responses associated with it without specifying exactly how the linkages 
are made and established. The cultural task analysis seeks to address socio-cultural 
processes that motivate the development of these linkages. We believe that addressing 
this issue is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the culture-mind interface and, 
moreover, there is a host of contrasting empirical implications of the two approaches that 




 In addition, it is also possible that a socio-cultural process builds on these cross-
culturally common contingencies to make some links more powerful and some others less 
so. In particular, a task of, say, “self-expression” may tend to promote a mandate of 
independence in all cultures. However, in some cultures people consensually agree that 
“self-expression” is a legitimate means for achieving independence, but not in many 
other cultures. Only in the former cultures will the act of self-expression be normatively 
sanctioned and socially rewarded. More generally, as noted by Thomas & Thomas (1928), 
beliefs imagined as real do become real in their consequences. Anecdotally, this point is 
painfully experienced by many of us who have ever tried to adjust to a foreign culture. 
The best conceivable and best intended action to adjust to a new culture (e.g., self-
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expression for lay Americans visiting Japan or self-effacement for lay Japanese visiting 
the U.S.) typically not only never works as intended, but often backfires miserably in the 
new culture. For instance, self-expression-in-American-style could be a sign of ultimate 
immaturity in Japan, whereas self-effacement-in-Japanese-style could merely 
demonstrate that the actor is a liar who must not be trusted in the U.S. 
 
3
 One exception to this generalization happens when situational constraints are not 
perceptually salient. Under these conditions, both Caucasian Americans and Asians show 
equally strong dispositional biases. However, once the situational constraints are 
perceptually made available, Asians do take them into account, but Caucasian Americans 
do not (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Masuda & Kitayama, 2004). 
 
4
 Our analysis implies that the psychological tendencies required for independent 
tasks are diametrically opposed to those required for interdependent tasks. Our prediction, 
therefore, was that the opposite ordering should be observed between the cultural regions 
in terms of interdependent implicit psychological tendencies. 
5
There are some important regional variations in Germany (Gebhardt, 2001; 
Tipton, 1976). In particular, traditionally Protestantism (which sanctions a more 
independent view) is stronger in northern regions of the country whereas Catholicism is a 
more dominant force in southern regions. Moreover, East Germany went through a 
prolonged period of communist rule after the World War II, with heavy influences from 
Russia. We reasoned that the Western tradition with an emphasis on independence is 
most clearly found in the northern, Protestant regions of the previous West Germany. The 
choice of a north-western city of Hamburg then enables us to perform the most 
conservative test of the voluntary settlement hypothesis. 
6
There are some important regional variations in the United Kingdom as well (e.g., 
Thomas, 1988; Hardill, Grajam, & Kofman, 2001). In particular, Protestantism is 
stronger in southern regions of the country whereas Catholicism has a greater domination 
in Northern Ireland. In addition to the prevalence of Protestantism which sanctions a 
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more independent view compared to Catholicism, various other cultural currents point to 
the view of the self as independent. They include a strong tradition of empiricism in 
philosophy, modern emergence of a strong merchant class especially after the Industrial 
revolution in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Many of these events occurred in 
England, of which the county of Essex is part. Again the choice of Essex enables us to 
perform a conservative test of the voluntary settlement hypothesis. 
 7
We also analyzed self size and friend size separately. Overall, the self circle size 
showed greater cross-cultural variation than the friend circle size. The self circle was 
largest in the U.S. (27.13) and smallest in Japan (22.33), with the U.K. and Germany 
falling in-between (26.22 and 26.04, respectively). In contrast, the friend circle was less 
variable, smallest in the U.S. (20.92), followed by Germany (21.59) and Japan (22.78). It 
was largest in the U.K. (23.22). 
 
8
Did Westerners draw a big self merely because they had fewer friends and thus 
more space was available for the self? This is unlikely. The data showed that on average, 
Japanese and British had the smallest (M = 11.30, SD = 5.24) and the largest (M = 18.12, 
SD = 6.25) number of friends with Germans (M = 15.52, SD = 5.44) and Americans (M = 
15.57, SD = 6.40) falling in-between. A country x gender ANCOVA with number of 
friends as a covariate again yielded a significant main effect of country, F (3, 399) = 
10.85, p < .001. This result indicates that the relative self-size varied in the expected way 
even when the number of friends was controlled for. 
 
9
In particular, no significant correlations were found between either one of the 
two Singelis subscales and the implicit psychological tendencies. Hence, the absence of 
the correlations between the Singelis difference scores and the implicit psychological 




One exception was the predictor of happiness measure, which did not correlate 




As Kashima (in press) notes, “[the knowledge activation approach] predicts that 
when cultural groups are shown to differ in strength in domain-specific constructs that 
are linked to domain-general constructs, these domain-specific constructs should cohere 
together (e.g., correlate with each other) (p. 55).” Here by domain-specific constructs he 
means what we refer to as psychological tendencies and by domain-general constructs he 
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Tendencies of experiencing disengaging emotions (pride in self, feelings of superiority, 
anger, and frustration) and engaging emotions (friendly feelings, feelings of 
connectedness with others, shame, and guilt) by the four cultural groups of people.  
 Disengaging Engaging 
US 3.57 (.69) 3.05 (.66) 
U.K. 3.35 (.73) 3.11 (.56) 
Germany 3.70 (.76) 3.54 (.74) 
Japan 2.46 (.88) 2.92 (.62) 
Note: Relevant standard deviations are presented in the parentheses above. 
 
Table 2 
Mean beta in predicting happiness as a function of emotion type and cultural group 
 B for Disengaging B for Engaging 
US .54 (.42) .38 (.33) 
U.K. .44 (.44) .44 (.36) 
Germany .36 (.68) .51 (.35) 
Japan .26 (.83) .64 (.35) 




Summary of the tri-cultural comparisons involving North America, Western Europe, and Asia on implicit measures of independence vs. 
interdependence and effect size. 














Dispositional bias in 
attribution 
US 
= Germany > 
Japan 0.70 0.09 -0.06 0.79 0.62 0.16 
= U.K. > 
Focused (vs. holistic) attention US 
> Germany > 
Japan 0.67 0.31 0.42 0.26 0.45 -0.15 
> U.K. >* 
Propensity to feel disengaging 
(vs. engaging) emotions 
US 
> Germany > 
Japan 1.47 0.54 0.45 1.03 0.91 0.10 
> U.K. > 
Personal (vs. social) correlates 
of happiness 
US 
> Germany = 
Japan 0.63 0.38 0.22 0.43 0.24 0.18 
= U.K. > 
Symbolic self-inflation US 
= Germany > 
Japan 0.86 0.20 0.39 0.51 0.69 -0.19 
> U.K. > 
Mean      0.87 0.30 0.28 0.60 0.58 0.02 
Note: The asterisk (*) above indicates marginal significance. 
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Table 4 
Explicit self-beliefs of independence and interdependence expressed by Americans, 
British, Germans, and Japanese. These beliefs were assessed by the Singelis scale of 
independent and interdependent self-construals. 
 Independence Interdependence 
Japan 3.34 (.53) 3.04 (.52) 
Germany 3.68 (.47) 3.11 (.43) 
U.K. 3.31 (.52) 3.31 (.37) 
U.S. 3.48 (.50) 3.49 (.38) 





Correlations among the five implicit measures (dispositional bias, focused vs. holistic 
attention, experience of disengaging vs. engaging emotions, personal vs. social happiness, 
and relative self-size) and one explicit measure (independence score – interdependence 













Focused attention .03     
Emotion: DE – E .00 .30**    
Personal  
happiness 
.03 .10 .09   
Symbolic self-
inflation 
.13 .04 .04 .02  
Singelis: Ind – Int .10 .03 .05 .02 .09 
Note: DE = Disengaging emotions; E = Engaging emotions; On all measures, higher 
numbers represent a stronger orientation toward independence vs. interdependence; ***p 




Correlations among the five implicit measures (dispositional bias, focused vs. holistic 
attention, experience of disengaging vs. engaging emotions, personal vs. social happiness, 
and relative self-size) and one explicit measure (independence score – interdependence 













Focused attention .03     
Emotion: DE – E .21* .06    
Personal 
happiness 
.01 .04 .21*   
Symbolic self-
inflation 
.13 .09 .12 .15  
Singelis: Ind – Int .12 .02 .04 .16 .08 
Note: DE = Disengaging emotions; E = Engaging emotions; On all measures, higher 
numbers represent a stronger orientation toward independence vs. interdependence; ***p 




Correlations among the five implicit measures (dispositional bias, focused vs. holistic 
attention, experience of disengaging vs. engaging emotions, personal vs. social happiness, 
and relative self-size) and one explicit measure (independence score – interdependence 













Focused attention .12     
Emotion: DE – E .15 .12    
Personal 
happiness 
.02 .05 .14   
Symbolic self-
inflation 
.02 .15 .12 .00  
Singelis: Ind – Int .01 .04 .15 .01 .07 
Note: DE = Disengaging emotions; E = Engaging emotions; On all measures, higher 
numbers represent a stronger orientation toward independence vs. interdependence; ***p 





Correlations among the three implicit measures (dispositional bias, focused vs. holistic 
attention, and relative self-size) and one explicit measure (independence score – 







Focused attention .00   
Symbolic self-
inflation 
.08 .00  
Singelis: Ind – Int .07  .23* .17 
Note: DE = Disengaging emotions; E = Engaging emotions; On all measures, higher 
numbers represent a stronger orientation toward independence vs. interdependence; ***p 





Figure 1. The cultural task analysis of the interaction between socio-cultural environment 
and psychological processes. This theoretical framework proposes that cultural mandates, 
cultural tasks, and psychological tendencies are linked to one another in a dynamic 
fashion. Cultural mandates refer to the ideals or general goal states (such as independence 
and interdependence) positively sanctioned by a given cultural group. Cultural tasks are 
composed of different procedures, means, or routines to achieve the pertinent mandate of 
culture. Any given person engages in a small number of cultural tasks to achieve his or 
her culture’s mandate. Moreover, each cultural task is linked to only a small subset of 
psychological tendencies associated with independence or interdependence. With these 
assumptions the cultural task analysis accounts for global cross-cultural differences 
without homogenizing each of the cultures. Within-culture individual differences are 
analyzed within the same theoretical framework. It may be anticipated that all individuals 
in any given culture are similar in terms of the mandate they seek to achieve, but they can 
differ markedly in terms of both the tasks they select to achieve that mandate and the 
psychological tendencies they acquire through repeated engagement in the selected tasks.  
  
Figure 2. Dispositional bias in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan: Dispositional 
judgment is stronger than situational judgment in all countries, but this effect was 
particularly pronounced in the three Western countries. There was no difference among 
these three countries. 
 
Figure 3. Mean errors in the absolute task and the relative task of the FLT in the U.S., 
U.K., Germany, and Japan: Although the error is generally smaller in the relative task 
than in the absolute task, this holistic tendency is most pronounced in Japan, least so in 
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the U.S., with the two European countries falling in-between. There was no difference 
between the two European countries. 
 
Figure 4. Tendency to experience disengaging vs. engaging emotions in 10 different 
social situations for Americans, British, Germans, and Japanese: Whereas Japanese 
experienced engaging emotions more, Americans experienced disengaging emotions 
more. The two European groups fell in-between, with no difference between them. 
 
Figure 5. Tendency to experience personal vs. social happiness in the U.S., the U.K., 
Germany, and Japan: Unstandardized regression coefficients used to predict happiness as 
a function of engaging positive emotions (e.g., friendly feelings) were subtracted from 
those used to predict happiness as a function of disengaging positive emotions (e.g., pride 
in self). Japanese show a tendency toward social happiness (i.e., greater effect of 
engaging than disengaging emotions) whereas Americans show a tendency toward 
personal happiness (i.e., greater effect for disengaging than engaging emotions). 
European countries fell in-between with no difference between them.  
 
Figure 6. Symbolic self-inflation (the tendency to see the self as bigger than friends) in 
the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and Japan: The symbolic self-inflation is most pronounced 
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